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Abstract
Many farmers are currently facing severe financial stress resulting in asset liquidations, problems in obtaining
credit, and even bankruptcy. An important question in policy analysis is the applicability of traditional farm
policy approaches to the problem of financial stress in agriculture. This is a particularly relevant question given
that the 1983 PIK program was one of the most expensive and largest government transfer programs for
agriculture in recent history, and yet many farms are still facing severe financial problems. In this discussion
the causes of current financial stress in agriculture and the role of past price and income support, credit and
tax policies in mitigating or contributing to this stress will be assessed. Then alternative policy options to
relieve the stress will be identified and evaluated. Selected options will be quantitatively analyzed using micro
and macro econometric simulation models. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.
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INTRODUCTION 
Many farmers are currently facing severe financial stress result-
ing in asset liquidations, problems in obtaining credit, and even bank-
ruptcy. An important question in policy analysis is the applicability 
of traditional farm policy approaches to the problem of financial 
stress in agriculture. This is a particularly relevant question given 
that the 1983 PIK program was one of the most expensive and largest 
government transfer programs for agriculture in recent history, and yet 
many farms are still facing severe financial problems. In this discus-
sion the causes of current financial stress in agriculture and the role 
of past price and income support, credit and tax policies in mitigating 
or contributing to this stress will be assessed. Then alternative pol-
icy options to relieve the stress will be identified and evaluated. 
Selected options will be quantitatively analyzed using micro and macro 
econometric simulation models. Finally, conclusions will be drawn. 
FINANCIAL STRESS: EXISTENCE AND CAUSES 
Existence 
Melichar [January, 1984] has documented the financial condition of 
the agricultural sector; that data will not be repeated in detail here. 
A key dimension of this documentation is the distribution of debt 
(Table 1). This distribution indicates that approximately 58 percent 
of the farms in the United States have leverage ratios of 10 percent or 
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less, 24 pHrcent have ratios from 11-40 percent, 11 percent have ratios 
of 41-70 percent and eight percent have leverage ratios in excess of 70 
percent. This highly leveraged category (greater than 70 percent) con-
trol 31 percent of the debt and eight percent of the assets in U.S. 
agriculture. With current price, cost, and productivity relationships 
in agriculture, these highly leveraged farms are unable to make inter-
est payments on their indebtedness, let alone repay any principal. In 
fact, Melichar's calculations suggest that farms with debt-to-asset 
ratios exceeding 30 percent will likely encounter some financial stress 
at current interest rates and rates of return on assets. 
Survey data from individual Iowa farms corroborates Melichar's re-
sults and implications [Jolly, 1984]. Of the 1,231 farmers surveyed, 
31 percent had no real estate or nonreal estate debt and exhibited 
debt-to-asset ratios averaging 1.8 percent; these farmers are not fi-
nancially stressed by the current economic conditions in agriculture. 
In contrast, 40 percent of the farmers have both real estate and non-
real estate debt and a debt-to-asset ratio averaging 41.7 percent. Of 
those with real estate loans (57 percent of the sample), 90 percent 
were current on interest and principal payments, 3.7 percent were cur-
rent on i~terest payments only, and 6.3 percent were delinquent on both 
principal and interest payments. For those with operating loans (51 
percent of the sample), 73 percent were current on principal and inter-
est payments, 18 percent were current on interest only, and 9 percent 
were delinquent on principal and interest. 
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Table 2 indicates the distribution of operators, assets, and lia-
bilities for the Iowa sample by debt-to-asset category; the distribu-
tional results are very similar to those in Table 1 from Melichar's 
work. Size classification of the data (Table 3) suggests that finan-
cial stress problems are not unique to a particular size firm--firms of 
all sizes are encountering such stress. 
More recent studies corroborate that the financial stress in agri-
culture is not unique to Iowa. A national survey in January, 1985, by 
Farm Journal and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
indicates that nationwide, 15.4 percent of farmers have debt-to-asset 
ratios exceeding 70 percent, and 17.9 percent have debt-to-asset ratios 
of 40-70 percent; these farmers account for 30.8 percent and 34.9 
percent of the debt respectively [Farm Journal, March 1985]. For the 
Central States, the data indicates a more severe problem; 21.0 percent 
of the farmers have debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 70 percent and 21.5 
percent have ratios of 40-70 percent. Comparing these numbers to those 
obtained for Iowa in 1984 suggests that the financial conditions have 
deteriorated significantly in just one year. 
A recently released USDA study also documents the nationwide char-
acteristics of the problem [U.S.D.A., 1985]. That study estimated that 
as of January, 1985, 6.3 percent of family sized farms in the u.s. 
holding 9.3 percent of the debt are insolvent; 7.4 percent of the farms 
holding 11.1 percent of the debt have debt-to-asset ratios from 70-100 
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percent, and 20 percent of the farms holding 25.9 percent of the debt 
have debt-to-asset ratios of 40-70 percent [Boehlje's Senate testimony, 
1985). 
Financial management strategies and enhanced farm and off-farm 
income can be used to relieve the stress for many farms,, but those with 
higher leverage ratios (for example, 70 percent or greater) will likely 
not be able to obtain sufficient relief from. various financial and farm 
management,strategies to stave off asset liquidation or default. In 
essence. at least 8-10 percent of u.s. farm. assets. must find a new owner 
in the next year or so. or the debt secured by .those assets will not be 
serviced. Even those with debt-to-asset ratios of 40-70 percent will 
experience declining equity (even if land values stabilize) unless 
commodity prices rise, interest rates and other input prices fall, or 
productivity increases. In essence, the financial stress is significant 
for a subset of the farm population. 
Causes and Characteristics 
The roots of the financial problems of farmers today can be traced 
to the.environm.ent of the 1970s and the dramatic changes in that en-
vironment during the early 1980s. The decade of the 1970s can be char-
·,, 
acterized by high inflation rates, growing foreign and domestic demand 
for farm products, very low or negative real rates of interest, and a 
willingness to substitute asset appreciation for current earnings. 
Farmers borrowed heavily to purchase capital inputs and farmland and to 
aggressively expand their operations. Then in the 1980s interest rates 
/ 
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rose to unprecedented high levels, foreign and domestic demand for farm 
commodities declined significantly because of world wide recession, in-
comes dropped dramatically, and land values began a steady and rela-
tively steep decline. Those farmers with high debt loads found it dif-
ficult to collateralize and service that debt with high interest rates, 
low incomes, and decreasing land values [Boehlje's Senate testimony, 1985]. 
To evaluate the relevance of public policy and, in particular, 
traditional farm income and price support programs, to the current fi-
nancial problems in agriculture, it is important to understand the 
broader dimensions of today's "'farm problem."' Clearly, farm incomes 
are lower than they were during a large part of the 1970s, but similar 
income levels were encountered in prior years without the severity of 
the financial pressures currently being felt. In fact, there are six 
additional characteristics of the current financial stress in agricul-
ture, and some of them will be only indirectly impacted by price and 
income support programs. 
In addition to lower incomes, farmers have a much higher debt-to-
income ratio than in prior years. Based on USDA data, aggregate debt 
of the U.S. agricultural sector was approximately 90 percent of net 
farm income in 1950, resulting in a debt to income ratio of less than 
one. This ratio rose to two in 1960, to approximately three in 1970, 
and now stands in excess of ten to one [Economic Indicators of the Farm 
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Sector: Income and Balance Sheet Statistics, 1982].1 Although non-
farm income of farmers has increased in relative importance in recent 
years, this income is concentrated on smaller farms that have lower 
debt loads, so does not significantly improve the debt carrying capac-
ity of those farmers with the majority of the debt [Melichar, November 
1984]. Thus, farmers are attempting to carry a much larger debt load 
per dollar of debt servicing capacity (i.e., income) which adds to 
their financial pressure.- In fact, to obtain a debt-to-income ratio 
representative of the mid-1970s would require incomes to more than 
triple, not a realistic possibility in the near future. Furthermore, 
the maturity structure on debt has shortened; farmers with lower in-
comes and higher debt loads are being required to repay that debt more 
rapidly. Institutional lenders such as banks and PCAs have shortened 
maturities to reduce their interest rate risk exposure. Although Fed-
eral Land Banks and other long-term institutional lenders have not ad-
justed terms significantly, land contracts, which comprise a substan-
tial portion of farm real estate debt, have become shorter in maturity 
in recent years. 
Another balance sheet adjustment which has occurred on many farms 
is that o{ reduced liquidity. In 1950 approximately 27 percent of the 
----·------
!Melichar has recalculated this ratio for 1983 by adjusting 
total income and debt by an estimate of the amount attriutable to land-
lords [Melichar, November 1984]. The result is a lower debt to income 
ratio in 1983 than that obtained with unadjusted data. However, simi-
lar adjustments must be made in earlier years to obtain comparable 
data, suggesting that the trend of a significantly rising debt to in-
come ratio over time still occurs. 
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asset base on the typical farm firm was liquid (i.e., financial assets 
or crop and livestock inventories); in 1980 only 11 percent was liquid 
[Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: Income and Balance Sheet Sta-
tistics, 1982].2 In the past, liquidity provided a safety valve for 
that farmer who did not generate sufficient income to meet the debt 
servicing requirement; he or she could sell part of the liquid asset 
base without sacrificing part of the productive plant--the land, 
machinery or breeding stock. Today, liquidity is gone--forcing some 
farmers to consider selling part of the fixed asset base to service 
their indebtedness. 
In reality, farmers dramatically restructured their balance sheets 
during the 1970s, increasing the amount of fixed assets compared to in-
ventories and other assets easily converted to cash in times of finan-
cial stress; and increasing the amount of current liabilities compared 
to longer term obligations, thus adding to the current debt servicing 
requirements. Improved farm incomes will help reduce the financial 
stress in agriculture, but will only eliminate this mismatching of 
assets and liabilities if farmers use the additional income to either 
pay down debt or increase liquidity rather than purchase fixed assets. 
Even if farmers use their improved incomes to restructure their balance 
-------------·------2Melichar has argued that the USDA Balance Sheet of Agriculture 
significantly understates financial assets in the agricultural sector, 
but even with his adjustments the proportion of total assets that were 
liquid (financial assets plus crop and livestock inventories) in 1980 
is not altered substantially [Melichar, 1983]. 
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sheets, the process will be slow--thus suggesting that financial stress 
will be a long-run problem for the agricultural sector. 
An additional characteristic of the current financial stress in 
agriculture is the increased income and collateral risk faced by most 
farmers. A significant change in government policy in the 1980s re-
sulted in a reduced safety net for agriculture and a movement to grad-
ually transfer the responsibility for managing risk from the government 
to the individual farmer. This change in philosophy is reflected in 
the substitution of crop insurance for disas·ter programs, the changing··· 
role of the Farmers Home Administration, and the approach to government 
farm program.S' that provides incentives for participation·but is not 
structured. to necessarily benefit those who do not participate and pay 
the '"insurance premium.·· Although the income risk in· agriculture may 
not be significantly larger this decade than last, the responsibility 
for managing that risk is being transferred from the public to the pri-
vate sector. Some farmers still have not accepted this concept. 
In addition to income risk, farmers are now facing collateral risk 
as well. During the three decades from 1950 to 1980, even when farm 
incomes turned down, the lending community was willing to extend credit 
to the agt:icultural sector because collateral values (specifically land 
values) were stable or rising. A key reason lenders have turned con-
servative during the last four years is that in addition to income 
risk, they are facing reduced collateral values and deteriorating se-
curity positions. Legitimately so, the borrower who has financial los-
/ 
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ses combined with declining collate.ral is perceived to be less credit-
worthy than one who has financial losses but stable or rising collat-
eral values. 
A further consequence of declining collateral values is that the 
traditional safety valve of the 1970s for farmers who could not meet 
the cash flow--that of refinancing--is either no longer available, or 
is quite costly because of higher interest rates. In reality, the 
agricultural sector no longer has a financial safety valve; adjustments 
on the liability side of the balance sheet to reduce financial pressure 
by extending the terms on the debt are no longer possible for many 
operators, and liquidity is nonexistent in many cases. Thus, a signif-
icant number of farmers are having to consider asset liquidations as a 
means of reducing or eliminating the financial pressures they are fac-
iq. 
A seventh characteristic of today's financial stress in agricul-
ture is that of higher and more volatile interest rates [Melichar, 
January, 1984]. When queried as to what is the fundamental reason why 
they have encountered financial difficulties, many farmers respond that 
they did not anticipate the dramatic rise in interest rates that 
occurred from the mid-1970s to 1980. A shift from relatively low real 
and nominal interest rates to relatively high rates is particularly 
devastating for an industry like agriculture that has a large propor-
tion of its total debt used to finance fixed assets on a variable rate. 
In other industries with a larger proportion of the debt used in inven-
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tory financing, it is easier to adjust debt utilization to rising 
interest rates. Because of the dominance of fixed assets in the asset 
base of the agricultural sector, and the necessity to finance those 
fixed assets with longer term financial obligations, it has been much 
more difficult for the farm sector to adjust to rising rates than other 
sectors of our economy. 
IMPACT OF PAST POLICIES 
A fundamental question in evaluating the future direction of agri-
cultural and economic policies is whether or not past policies have 
contributed to the financial stress of agriculture; if so one should be 
careful that such policies are not continued or repeated. The three 
areas of policy that merit evaluation in answering this question are 
price and income support policy, federal credit and interest rate pol-
icy, and tax policy. 
Price and income support policy 
In recent years, government support prices for agricultural com-
modities have been formally or informally indexed to the cost of pro-
duction--as costs of production (variously defined) rose, support 
prices rose. In terms of financial stress, the issue is how have such 
indexed support prices affected price expectations of producers, re-
source values, and debt-carrying and debt-servicing capacity. 
Analysis of the impact of government price and income support pro-
grams on asset values, particularly land, indicates that such programs 
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have put upward pressure on prices. Hedrick [1962) documented that 
peanut price support and allotment program benefits have been capital-
ized into land values. Similar analyses have been completed by Boxley 
and Gibson [1964) and Boxley and Anderson [1973) for peanuts and to-
bacco, respectively. A more recent study by Reynolds and Timmons 
[1969) confirms that government farm program payments have resulted in 
higher land values in the Midwest as well. 
However, the cost-of-production approach to specifying support 
prices provides a much more direct linkage between government pro-
grams and land values than previous policies. Using an income capital-
ization model, Boehlje and Griffin [1979) indicate that cost of produc-
tion indexed price supports not only increase the expected income, thus 
generating higher land values, but they also truncate the left tail of 
the price distribution, thus decreasing the price risk and the capital-
ization rate which results in further upward pressure on land values. 
Furthermore, the guaranteed cash flow of such a support price system 
increases the debt carrying capacity of the firm. These results 
strongly support the argument that government farm programs of the past 
decade have increased the guaranteed cash flow of the farm business and 
reduced the financial risk, resulting in increased bid prices for dur-
able assets such as land, increased debt-carrying capacity and thus fi-
nancial leverage, and a more rapid rate of growth of the farm. Thus, 
such programs have contributed to the financial stress in agriculture 
for those who entered the sector or expanded after the mid-seventies. 
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Credit and interest rate policy 
Public sector lending to farm firms has been a reality for many 
years, but with the recent economic and financial stress in agricul-
ture, pressures have developed for larger public sector lending pro-
grams for farmers. However, some analysts have suggested that part of 
the current financial stress of some farmers can be attributed to sub-
sidized public sector lending in the past, and that additional credit 
will do little to relieve the financial stress for those farmers who are 
already highly leveraged [Financial Stress, 1984.; George Irwin's Senate 
testimony, 1985]. 
To most people, public credit in agriculture means the Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA). The FmHA program has undergone dramatic changes 
in recent years. In 1960, FmHA administered eight programs of which farm 
operating loans accounted for 64 percent and farm ownership loans ac-
counted for 14 percent of loan volume. By 1982, FmHA operated 23 grant 
and loan programs, with farm operating loans accounting for 15 percent 
and farm ownership loans accounting for eight percent of loan volume 
[Economic Research Service, u.s. Department of Agriculture, 1984]. 
Emergency disaster, economic emergency, individual housing, rural rental 
housing, w~ter and waste loans and grants, and business and industrial 
development loans each accounted for larger shares of FmHA activity in 
recent years. 
This does not necessarily mean that FmHA has neglected its tradi-
tional role. The absolute level (as opposed to percentage share) of 
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farm operating and farm ownership loans has been at a record high in 
recent years. What the current situation does indicate is that the 
FmHA has become a giant, many-faceted agency that perhaps has been ab-
sorbing programs and mandates (many unrequested) faster than it can 
maintain a clear sense of purpose and direction. More than $8 billion 
in loan and grant obligations were made by FmHA in 1982, a decrease 
from the high of nearly $14 billion in 1979 and 10 times the amount of 
1962 [Lee, Gabriel, and Boehlje, 1980]. 
Who is served by FmHA's farmer oriented programs? By design, the 
agency is a lender of last resort; that is, its borrowers are supposed 
to be those unable to obtain funding elsewhere. A recent study of bor-
rower characteristics suggests that in 1979 the farm operating and farm 
ownership loans were heavily directed to young farmers and those with 
small net worth and low incomes [Lee, Gabriel, and Boehlje, 1980]. 
Over 68 percent of the money loaned in the farm ownership program that 
year went to farmers with less than $12,000 in net cash income and less 
than $120,000 in net worth. Over 74 percent of farm operating loan 
money went to farmers in the same category. In the same year, 50 per-
cent of the money loaned in each of these programs went to people under 
the age of 30. 
However, the economic emergency loans were distributed a bit dif-
ferently. The borrowers tended to have low income (presumably, that is 
what put them in an "emergency" situation), but over a third of the 
money loaned in 1979 went to farmers with more than half a million dol-
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lars in assets. Farms with gross value of sales of over $40,000 repre-
sented one-fifth of all farms, but received more than two-thirds of the 
money loaned under the Economic Emergency Program in 1979. 
The FmHA share of total farm debt has grown rapidly in recent 
years with FmHA holding 15 percent of the nonreal estate farm debt in 
1984. Regionally, the Southeastern states are much more dependent upon 
FmHA debt than other regions of the United States. This rapid growth 
in volume, combined with the current economic stress, has resulted in 
severe repayment problems on the part of FmHA farm borrowers. A total 
of 24.6 percent of all farm program borrowers were delinquent at fiscal 
year-end 1982; 31 percent of active farm program borrowers totaling 
approximately 84,000 clients had missed their scheduled payments as of 
July 31, 1983 [Farmer Home Administration, 1984]. These delinquency 
rates are clear cause for alarm as to the viability of FmHA farm lend-
ing programs. A fundamental issue is whether such high delinquency 
rates are a function of inadequate procedures in loan extension and 
supervision, or whether such performance is "normal" in times of eco-
nomic stress. Irrespective of the answer, extension of significant 
amounts of credit (much of it at subsidized rates) by FmHA has contrib-
uted to t\:le high debt load in agriculture. 
Providing public credit through FmHA or other agencies to preserve 
the normally healthy, moderate-size farm temporarily caught in adverse 
conditions could be consistent with the long-term goals of agricultural 
policy. Present trends suggest that about two-thirds of the land sold 
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each year is bought by farmers and consolidated into existing farm 
units. This is the primary source of increasing concentration in the 
farm sector. If the normally-healthy-but-temporarily-in-trouble farms 
are allowed to go out of business, it is reasonable to assume that some 
portion of them will be consolidated into other existing units. Thus, 
assuring that such farms obtain the funds needed to stay viable would 
be consistent with the goals of efficiency, preserving a pluralistic 
agriculture for resiliency and future flexibility, providing economic 
opportunity for more people, and ultimately assuring food security. 
But there are some risks to the public sector. This problem can be 
minimized by reducing the subsidy as much as possible, thus reducing 
the attractiveness of the emergency credit. 
If, instead of a moderate-size family farm, ·the farm in temporary 
trouble is very large, it is not clear that the same arguments for pub-
lic credit assistance hold. If the farm was much larger than necessary 
to achieve efficiency, and if the odds favored some or all of the land 
being sold in smaller tracts to new farmers or moderate-sized existing 
farmers, there would be no particular public interest in saving the 
larger farm. 
There would appear to be no direct economic reason for offering 
subsidized public credit to preserve those farms that are submarginal 
even under normal economic conditions and for whom that does not appear 
to be a temporary phenomenon. Both the subsidy in the credit program 
and the inefficient use of resources implied by the farm being submar-
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ginal are social costs. However, perhaps one more question should be 
asked: Is the social cost ultimately greater if the farmer goes out of 
business? This is not likely if there is alternative gainful employ-
ment. But if the displaced farmers or workers end up as a public lia-
bility anyway, social costs may be minimized by extension of public 
credit to keep them in business, at least until better opportunities 
are available. 
The same general comments apply to the farmers in trouble because 
of natural disasters. That is, it would be consistent with goals of 
efficiency, competitiveness, and future flexibility to provide public 
credit assistance to efficient-size family farms. For larger farms the 
question is how far the public should go in sharing the risks and pro-
tecting the interests of the wealthy. 
For a third group, those who need specialized help or terms, the 
appropriateness of public credit assistal'.ce depends on the likelihood 
that the operator will successfully graduate to private credit and 
eventually repay the public investment through taxes; on efficient use 
of resources; and on contribution to pluralism in the farm sector. It 
is in these programs, more than any other, that social objectives and 
economic objectives of credit policy come face to face. 
Little need be said about the impact of interest rate policy on 
agriculture. Stimulative fiscal policy and tight monetary policy com-
bined with deregulation of interest rates and implementation of mone-
tary policy by controlling the money supply rather than pegging inter-
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est rates has resulted in higher and more volatile costs of money for 
farmers. We have moved from an extended period of low and predictable 
real rates of interest to high and volatile rates, and because of the 
fixed asset based in agriculture and the long-term financing needs, 
farmers have not been able to adjust borrowing levels to the higher 
rates. In fact, some have argued that government fiscal and monetary 
policy as it impacts interest rates is the major contributor to finan-
cial stress in agriculture, and that policies that will lower interest 
rates are more important to the long run financial health of agricul-
tural than credit or price and income support policy [Ag Policy, 1984]. 
This argument will be evaluated further later in this discussion. 
Tax policy 
Numerous studies have shown that taxes and tax management play a 
significant role in the choice among various production, marketing, 
and financial strategies by farmers. These studies also indicate that 
tax policy has influenced purchasing patterns for capital assets and 
exerted upward pressure on farm asset prices, particularly farmland 
[Davenport, et al. 1982]. This pressure comes about because land pro-
vides an ideal tax shelter. The return obtained from appreciation or 
increases in land value is not taxed until the property is sold. And 
if the land is held until death, this return is exempted. Carrying 
costs in the form of interest are fully deductible and may offset in-
come from other sources. In essence, income taxed at low rates, or 
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perhaps even exempt from tax, is combined with fully deductible costs--
the classic tax shelter. Furthermore, farmland under the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 has become an estate tax shelter as well as an income tax 
shelter. 
At the same time, the provisions of both the income and estate tax 
law contain futures that tend to restrict the supply of land offered 
for sale. In the case of the income tax, the exemption from tax of 
gains on property that passes at death encourages the holding of land 
until death. In regard to estate tax, the ownership requirements that 
must be met to qualify for the estate tax preferences discourage sales 
both before and after death. The greater demand for land and the re-
striction of its supply have operated to keep upward pressure on prices 
of farmland. 
Tax laws appear to have also encouraged the growth of individual 
farm firms. The use of cash accounting allows farming to be a tax 
sheltered industry. So long as there is other income that would be 
subject to tax except for the tax shelter, taxpayers in a higher tax 
bracket have more funds for growth and expansion than they would if the 
tax sheltered asset did not exist. Furthermore, however great is the 
advantage.of cash accounting, it is augmented if some of the income 
produced through deductions can be reported as capital gain which is 
taxed at lower, preferential rates. Investment tax credit provisions, 
accelerated depreciation, and the tax deductibility of interest have 
also encouraged firm expansion and the substitution of capital for 
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labor. By encouraging growth of the firm, increased use of debt, the 
substitution of capital for labor, and higher land prices, tax policy 
has contributed to the current financial stress in agriculture. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
Given the financial stress faced by the agricultural sector, a 
relevant question is what should be the appropriate policy response? 
The agricultural sector is facing a new financial and economic environ-
ment, and adjusting to that environment may require government assist-
ance to make sure that the process of adjustment is not too costly in 
terms of financial and human losses. However, most analysts believe 
that in the intermediate-term agriculture must also adjust to excess 
production capacity and lower values for some agricultural resources, 
particularly land [Financial Stress, 1984; Ag Policy, 1985]. If this 
is the case, then a public policy that impedes that adjustment will not 
only be very costly, but may result in long-term dependence on govern-
ment assistance as well as continued government interference. What 
kind of policy response is targeted to the problems of financial 
stress, is politically acceptable in an environment of fiscal 
restraint, and does not impede the long-term adjustments that are nec-
essary to maintain a productive, efficient, and financially healthy 
agriculture? 
Much of the past debate concerning the public response to assist 
farmers in financial stress has focused on the traditional approach to 
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agricultural policy--various forms of price and income supports. Such 
a policy response may not only be an extremely high cost alternative, 
but if improperly implemented might result in disincentives to adjust 
the resource use in agriculture to the slower growth in demand for its 
products. Higher incomes would contribute to a healthy agricultural 
sector, but the current financial stress problem in agriculture is much 
more complex. In fact, an income policy focusing on surpluses and sup-
ply control may not only miss the target from a prospective of the pro-
blem, but because most of the support will go to larger farms, whereas 
farms of all sizes are exhibiting financial stress, such a program may 
miss the target audience as well. Other means for enhancing the income 
of agriculture through subsidizing and promoting exports, devaluing the 
dollar, expanding domestic consumption including bio-mass production 
and fuel use, and converting grainland to grassland also have similar 
problems--they only focus on one dimension of today's financial crisis 
in agriculture. A broader set of policies and a broader perspective of 
the problem is likely required to develop an adequate solution to 
today' s "farm problem." 
Public policy currently does encumbrance a set of rules to resolve 
severe financial stress problems--the bankruptcy rules. Although bank-
ruptcy may involve immediate liquidation of the assets and a discharge 
of the indebtedness of the farm [Chap. 7 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 
Public Law No. 95-593, 92 Stat. 2549, 1978], it can also involve re-
structuring and rehabilitating the business under Chapter 11 or 13 of 
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the bankruptcy law. Farmers can not be forced into an involuntary bank-
ruptcy. A farmer who chooses Chapter 11 (or possibly Chapter 13) bank-
ruptcy proceedings becomes a "debtor in possession"---generally the 
farmer continues to manage and operate the farm, possibly under the 
surveillance of a creditor's committee [Looney, 1980]. A trustee to 
manage the property is appointed only in rare cases, so the farmer can 
continue to operate the farm as long as he develops an acceptable debt 
reduction plan. 
The bankruptcy rules specify how the private sector will share fi-
nancial losses in case of a default by a creditor, but two fundamental 
issues remain. First, should the private sector--the creditor, the 
debtor, and others who have or are doing business with the debtor ab-
sorb the full loss, or should the public sector share in part of this 
loss through some type of government transfer payment program? And 
second, and probably most important, is the question concerning who in 
the private sector under the current provisions will typically be re-
quired to absorb the majority of the loss? Because of the extensive 
use of merchant and dealer credit in agriculture provided by input sup-
ply firms who are usually unsecured creditors, the bankruptcy rules 
will likely transfer the major losses from the production sector and 
the lending institutions to the input supply firms. In many cases the 
financial losses will be transferred from those who have been directly 
involved in the financial management and debt utilization decisions 
(i.e., the producer and his lending institution) to those who have only 
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been peripherally involved in those decisions (i.e., the input supply 
firm and other unsecured creditors including many landlords). A fun-
damental question can be raised as to the equitability of this sharing 
of the financial losses due to debtor default. 
A second rather blunt policy instrument that might be used to re-
spond to the current financial stress in agriculture is a debt morator-
ium. This alternative would deny the use of foreclosure procedures 
against farmers who cannot make their principal and interest payments, 
cancel or defer interest and principal payments for a time specific, 
write down a portion or all of the indebtedness, deny deficiency judg-
ments for those who cannot make their payments, or various combinations 
of the above. The purpose of such a policy response would be to enable 
the financially pressed producer to temporarily be relieved of the fi-
nancial obligations associated with excessive debt. Most debt morator-
ium proposals include a temporary, time limited period where debt obli-
gations need not be met, but they do not eliminate the eventual and de-
finite commitment to repay indebtedness. Consequently, a key to the 
success of such proposals is the assumption that the financial condi-
tion of the firm and the industry will improve sufficiently in the in-
tervening period so that the obligations can be repaid. Debt moratori-
ums have been used with limited success in previous periods of finan-
cial stress, specifically the 1930s, to relieve the financial pressure 
faced by farmers. 
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The major direct cost of a debt moratorium is the income foregone 
by the lenders during the moratorium period, But in addition to this 
cost, there is serious concern about the implications of such programs 
on the long-run performance of the financial markets. The implementa-
tion of a debt moratorium would likely result in the lending institu-
tions concluding that such a prospect has a higher probability in fu-
ture periods of financial stress. Consequently, lenders who feel their 
earnings flow may be interrupted by future moratoria will likely judge 
that there is more financial risk in credit extension and would expect 
to be compensated for that risk through higher rates of interest. Fur-
thermore, some borrowers would no longer be able to obtain credit even 
if they have adequate collateral because a debt moratorium has negated 
the value of collateral in the credit extension decision, In essence, 
the use of this particular alternative would likely result in chaotic 
conditions in the financial markets, higher interest rates for the 
agricultural sector, and the definite prospect that many firms would no 
longer be able to obtain credit. 
Another possible public policy response is the provision of loan 
guarantees from a federal or state agency to indemnify the lending 
institution from potential default on the part of a borrower. The pro-
vision of a government loan guarantee would reduce the risk faced by 
the lender, thus encouraging forbearance and loan restructuring. A 
loan guarantee might be conditional upon an approved plan of liquida-
tion or other more permanent solutions. Such a program is currently 
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available from the Farmer's Home Administration; additional funding 
could be made available for this program which would eliminate the need 
for unique legislation. 
To be a permanent and effective solution, a loan guarantee program 
must be combined with other alternatives such as systematic asset or 
liability restructuring to reduce the debt obligation or increase the 
cash flow of the business. Properly structured, a loan guarantee pro-
gram may provide the time necessary to implement other more permanent 
solutions and protect the resource markets from collapsing in the proc-
ess. Without such a long-term solution, a loan guarantee program might 
be perceived as simply a ''lender bailout." A variation of the loan 
guarantee program is to offer the lender a federal or state bond in ex-
change for the loan; such a program transfers the responsibility for 
collection as well as the debt obligation to the government and quite 
likely would result in higher cost than the traditional Farmer's Home 
Administration, SBA, or other government guarantee. 
A proposal which has received wide-spread attention recently is 
that of federally assisted debt restructuring. In fact most of the 
current legislative proposals are variations of the debt restructuring 
theme. Th.e premise of this approach is that providing additional time 
to repay the principal would reduce annual obligations, thus enabling 
some farmers to cover these lower principal and interest payments. And 
for those who still cannot meet their debt obligations, restructuring 
would give them some additional time to rearrange the financial struc-
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ture of their business including possibly the sale of assets. Most re-
structuring proposals involve the potential of a write-down of the debt 
obligation as a condition to obtain a federal or state guarantee [Harl, 
May, 1984]. The key concept is to provide a government incentive for 
the private sector to implement workout plans and to "buy time" so that 
these plans can be implemented rather than forcing the sale of assets 
and collapsing the resource markets. For many producers who are facing 
financial stress, such a program again may not be a permanent solution, 
but the first step in a longer-run plan to adjust the asset and liabil-
ity structure of the business so that the firm can survive. 
As noted earlier, one of the severe problems faced by agriculture 
has been higher interest rates. Consequently, various proposed policy 
responses include interest rate buy-downs or subsidies which are focus-
ed at reducing this component of the cost structure for farmers. 
Interest rate buy-downs can be implemented in many ways including a 
direct government subsidy of interest rates for farmers, an increased 
tax write-off for farm interest payments, a public guarantee to reduce 
the risk faced by the lender and therefore allow him (her) to charge a 
lower interest rate to the borrower, and the use of tax exempt revenue 
bonds to obtain lower cost funds for agriculture. Temporary interest 
rate reductions would benefit farmers in the short-run, because inter-
est has become a major component of the cost of production, particular-
ly for those who are highly leveraged. However, a preferred alterna-
tive to interest rate buy-downs for agriculture would be a fiscal 
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policy that reduces the size of the government deficit and the demands 
of the federal government on the capital markets. Such policy would 
result in lower market rates of interest throughout the U.S. economy, 
which would have similar benefits to farmers as an interest rate buy-
down plan in terms of reducing their cost of production. Furthermore, 
lower interest rates in general would have a significant impact on the 
demand for agricultural commodities by making u.s. investments less at-
tractive to foreign investors, thus reducing the demand for the dollar 
which would result in lower exchange rates and increased export demand 
for agricultural commodities. The consequences of interest rate buy-
down alternatives will be quantitatively assessed in a later section. 
As suggested earlier, debt restructuring may not be adequate for 
some producers and asset restructuring including liquidation may be re-
quired to improve the chances of survivability of the firm. Much of 
the current asset restructuring involves liquidation of real estate and 
other capital items for cash, but there is only so much liquidity in 
rural communities, and cash liquidations frequently result in substan-
tial liquidation losses. Other means of liquidation must be investi-
gated and could be facilitated by public policy. For example, lending 
institutions might be encouraged to take the title of real property in 
lieu of debt obligations, and then lease this property back to the 
original debtor. Such an arrangement would keep the property off the 
market and thus reduce the chance of resource markets being depressed 
further. In addition, by leasing the property back to the original 
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operator, other resources such as machinery and equipment could be ef-
ficiently utilized rather than also being in excess. The lender 
through this process can convert a nonperforming asset into one that 
generates at least some rate of return in the form of rental payments. 
To reduce the possibility that the lender must tie up its liquidity in 
such assets, a government program of providing funds to the lender in 
the amount of the assets taken back in lieu of debt could be imple-
mented. In fact, government funds could be provided to the institution 
at a cost which would typically be lower than the cost of funds from 
the private sector, which would thus partly off-set the lower yield be-
ing earned by the asset. Such a program might require the lender to 
remove the assets from its portfolio over a two or three-year period 
with the original debtor having a first option to buy. A similar pro-
gram might be implemented by a state agency or a newly formed private 
sector firm funded through state or federal revenue bonds. 
Again, one of the purposes of such a program is to stabilize re-
source values. A critical issue today is whether the public sector 
should play a role in asset liquidations in the form of regulating, 
monitoring or facilitating the process. Legitimate concerns have been 
expressed about the attitudes of some lenders who are encouraging cash 
sales of assets without recognition of the implications for the pro-
ducer or the asset markets. Collateral values are declining in part 
because of forced sales of assets for cash into a market where there is 
limited buying power. We need to be much more innovative in the liqui-
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dation process, and we need to evaluate whether there is something that 
should be done in the public policy arena to assist in this financial 
stress environment. 
A final alternative that might involve public policy is that of 
recapitalization. In many cases, the financial structure of the busi-
ness could be significantly improved through an infusion of equity from 
outside the firm, either by a debt holder exchanging his obligation for 
an equity position in the firm, or an outside investor providing addi-
tional funds which are used to reduce indebtedness. An equity infusion 
may at first glance appear to be difficult to orchestrate. Who would 
want to put equity into a financially troubled firm? In some cases 
family members may be willing to provide such an infusion to protect 
the integrity of a family business. An expected future inheritance of 
nonbusiness assets could be converted into current cash through sale to 
other family members. A nonfamily investor might be willing to con-
tribute capital for a larger-than-proportionate share of the ownership 
of the firm. Some investors may be attracted by the tax shelter avail-
able from operating losses; under certain conditions, an operating loss 
is, in reality, an asset for a high tax bracket investor. And unused 
tax credits may be available to make the equity infusion more attrac-
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rive for the investor. 
The third source of an equity infusion is the lender. In some 
cases, the financial condition of the firm is such that the lender will 
incur a significant loss if the note is called, foreclosure occurs, or 
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the operator takes advantage of the bankruptcy procedures. If the firm 
has current cash flow problems because of high leverage and aggressive 
growth, but strong management and the potential for reasonable future 
earnings, the lender may minimize losses or increase the chances for 
recovery by converting debt obligations into equity. This conversion 
reduces the current cash flow burden of excessive debt servicing and 
releases resources (both funds and management) to use in more produc-
tive activities that will enhance current and future income. 
The role of public policy in this area of outside equity infusions 
or recapitalization may be one of reassessing current legislation which 
discourages such arrangements. Many states have passed laws that re-
strict or prohibit outside equity investments in agriculture. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions should be reassessed in the current finan-
cial stress environment. Alternatively, a government financed venture 
capital entity might be formed to make the necessary equity capital in-
fusion into agriculture under terms that are more acceptable to both 
farmer and investor. Such an arrangement could be financed with state 
revenue bonds or federal funding. An institution not all that dissimi-
lar from Agricultural Development Banks used in many Third World coun-
tries which involves a combination of public and private sector 
funding might be a viable institutional innovation in the U.S. capital 
markets at the present time. 
A final role of public policy in the current environment would be 
one of providing information to facilitate the adjustment process. 
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Programs to facilitate the merger of business firms, to retrain and re-
locate people, and to disseminate the best information on adjustment 
strategies and resource availability might make the adjustments less 
painful for those involved. However, it is not clear that such pro-
grams would be an adequate response to the current financial stress 
problem in agriculture. 
ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 
The purpose of this section will be to evaluate the aggregate and 
firm level impacts of selected policy options. The focus of this 
analysis will be on interest rate buy-downs, refinancing and extending 
repayment terms, and sale leasebacks and asset liquidations. The 
aggregate implications of interest rate buy-downs and extending repay-
ment terms as well as a ''stronger economy" will be discussed first; 
then the micro implications of these options along with the asset 
liquidation alternative will be reviewed. 
Aggregate analysis 
The aggregate analyses were completed using an econometric simula-
tion model developed by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Devel-
opment which projects the future production and financial characteris-
tics of the agricultural sector. The model (crop, livestock, and 
finance sectors) was estimated block recursively with data from the 
1960 to 1980 period. The crop and the livestock sectors were solved 
simultaneously and the results were fed to the finance sector recur-
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sively. Previous studies documenting the model and its historical per-
formance indicate that it has a high degree of reliability and should 
have good predictive power [Thamodaran, et al. and Thamodaran, et al., 
both forthcoming]. 
In this analysis, the model was first used to develop a base sce-
nario to the year 1995 of the expected financial condition of u.s. 
agriculture. Then, alternative financial stress policies were imposed 
and the results under these policy options are compared to the base re-
sults. The first policy option, that of interest rate buy- downs, as-
sumes that interest rates are reduced on real estate debt by three per-
centage points for the years 1985-1988, and rates on non-real estate 
debt are reduced by four percentage points for the same time period. 
After this four-year period of rate buy-downs, interest rates are 
assumed to return to the rates used in the base run. During the four-
year period, the majority (80 percent) of the increased farm income 
resulting from the interest rate buy-down is allocated to repay princi-
pal on the nonreal estate debt. Thus, most of the interest cost sav-
ings must be used for debt reduction, not for capital expenditures or 
family living. For the policy option of extending loan terms, the 
extension is accomplished by reducing the annual repayment rate on both 
real estate and non-real estate debt by 25 percent. In essence, this 
approach means that farmers are required to only pay 75 percent of 
their scheduled principal payments with the remainder being deferred. 
This program is again assumed to be available for a four-year period 
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from 1985-1988 with a return to the base scenario repayment rate for the 
years 1989 and thereafter. 
One should note that these two programs as analyzed in the aggre-
gate framework are drastic and nondiscriminatory. The methodology does 
not allow for targeting--selective application of the policy alterna-
tives to only a specific group of farmers. The purpose of this aggre-
gate analysis is to evaluate the implications of broad sweeping nontar-
geted approaches such as making debt restructuring or interest rate 
buy-down arrangements available for all farmers. The actual implemen-
tation of such programs would preferably be on a targeted basis. The 
aggregate results presented here suggest the direction of the impacts 
of a targeted vs. nondiscriminatory program if not the magnitude of 
those impacts. 
The third option assumes reduced interest rates and a stronger de-
mand for farm products. Although this is not a policy focusing unique-
ly on farm financial stress, government macro policy will directly 
influence the farm economy. In simple terms, this ''stronger economy" 
scenario assumes lower interest rates and higher crop exports. Real 
estate and nonreal estate interest rates are lowered by three percent-
age points from the base run values for the entire 10-year period 
(1985-1995), and farm exports are assumed to be 10 percent higher than 
the base run levels. The changes in critical assumptions and the 
financial results of the simulations are summarized in Tables 4-7. 
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The short-run and long-run financial implications of these three 
policy options can best be appreciated by comparing the results for 
each policy option to the base results for the years 1988 and 1995, re-
spectively (Table 4). With an interest rate buy-down option, the 
short-run (1988) result is higher net farm income and cash flow com-
pared to the base analysis (Table 5). This higher income and cash flow 
is used to repay part of the nonreal estate debt, resulting in lower 
liabilities and higher equity with similar total asset values. In the 
short-run, the financial condition of the sector as measured by the 
equity-to-asset ratio is improved with the interest rate buy-down com-
pared to the base results. 
The long-run (1995) implications of an interest rate buy-down are 
slightly higher incomes and cash flows, in large part because of the 
reduced liabilities. As to long-run financial structure, the assets, 
equities, and equity-to-asset ratio are slightly higher for the inter-
est rate buy-down option compared to the base analysis. Thus, the 
interest rate buy-down option appears to have a beneficial short-run 
and long-run impact on the agricultural sector, assuming the interest 
cost savings are used to reduce outstanding debt. Other analyses indi-
cate that if the interest cost savings are used instead for improved 
family living and capital expenditures, the debt load is not reduced 
and in the long run the financial condition of the sector as measured 
by annual flows of income and cash deteriorates from the base analysis. 
Lengthening repayment schedules (reducing the repayment rate) has 
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different short-run and long-run implications for the agricultural sec-
tor (Table 6). In the short-run (1988), this policy option will result 
in lower incomes but higher cash flow. The lower income will occur be-
cause liabilities are being repaid at a slower rate, thus resulting in 
higher total interest cost. Furthermore, lower income results in a 
lower rate of growth in assets since purchases of capital items are 
significantly related to net farm income. Equity is lower under the 
reduced repayment rate option as is the equity-to-asset ratio. In the 
long-run (1995) income is slightly lower with this option compared to 
the base run, and cash flow is reduced because principal obligations 
that were delayed in earlier years must now be repaid. The financial 
condition of the industry as measured by assets, liabilities, and 
equity is significantly improved in 1995 compared to 1988. 
The "stronger economy" scenario provides a much brighter outlook 
for farm financial conditions (Table 7). In the short-run (1988) in-
comes and cash flows are significantly higher than the base-run values. 
The higher incomes and lower interest costs translate into higher 
valued assets in agriculture. The financial condition as reflected in 
equity and the equity-to-asset ratio is significantly improved compared 
to the bas.e-run. Furthermore, the brighter outlook for agriculture 
with a stronger economy is sustained and improved in the long-run 
(1995). 
In essence, the aggregate results suggest that the interest rate 
buy-down option will reduce the short-run income and cash flow pres-
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sures snd stabilize income and cash flow in the long-run compared to 
the base; the financial condition of the sector as measured by stocks 
will improve in the short-run and remain about the same as the base in 
the long-run under this option. A lengthening of repayment terms will 
result in reduced income and higher cash flow in the short-run, but 
similar incomes and lower cash flow in the long-run compared to the 
base; the financial condition of the sector as measured by stocks will 
deteriorate slightly compared to the base under this option. A 
stronger economy as reflected in reduced interest rates and higher ex-
ports will not only solve the short-run income and cash flow problems 
but also alleviate the long-run problems; the financial condition of 
the sector as measured by financial stocks and the equity-to-asset 
ratio will improve significantly in the long-run compared to the base 
under this assumption. 
Firm Level Analyses 
The consequences of interest rate buy-downs and lengthening repay-
ment terms along with asset restructuring on individual firms will be 
illustrated using a representative cash-grain farm and a representative 
hog farm. The cash-grain farm is comprised of 435 acres of row crop 
land and total assets valued at $925,000; the hog farm is a farrow-to-
finish operation consisting of 425 acres of land and total assets val-
ued at $965,000. Different financial structures for both farms are re-
flected through debt-to-asset ratios of 33, SO, and 67 percent. Addi-
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tiona! key assumptions used in the analyses are summarized in Table 8. 
The financial consequences of various policy options were simulated 
over a 10-year period using the Iowa State University financial plan-
ning model. This firm level simulation model was econometrically esti-
mated using farm record data from the Iowa Farm Business Association 
for the years 1964-1982. Numerous previous studies have been completed 
using the model providing various tests of its validity [Reinders, 
1983; Wickham, 1984; Doye and Boehlje, 19841. 
The various policy options were simulated by exogenous changes in 
parameters in the model. To simulate interest rate buy-downs, rates on 
long-term loans were reduced by three percentage points for the first 
four years of the ten-year planning horizon, and rates on short-term 
loans were reduced by four percentage points for the first year of the 
planning horizon only (short-term interest rates could be reduced for 
only the first year because of the structure of the model). Lengthen-
ing of loan repayment schedules was implemented by reducing the annual 
principal payments on long-term loans by 25 percent for the first four 
years and then increasing the repayment schedule for the remaining six 
years to compensate for the earlier reduction. Repayment rates on 
short-term loans were not adjusted since the model essentially uses 
short-term borrowing to cover cash flow shortfalls and uses excess cash 
to reduce short-term obligations. Asset restructuring options were 
incorporated in the model by assuming that the indebted portion of the 
real estate base was sold at a value equal to that used in the balance 
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sheet for determining collateral value, and then those assets were 
leased back under conventional lease terms. One strategy for accom-
plishing this objective would be for the lender to take title to the 
asset in lieu of debt (assuming the asset value exceeded secured 
indebtedness) and then lease it back to the original owner. A special 
agricultural credit corporation or development bank with a combination 
of public or private sector funding might also be the holder of such 
assets [Harl, November, 1984]. Or the property might be sold to a non-
farm investor and then leased back. 
The simulation model was run in a Monte Carlo mode with 50 obser-
vations of stochastic cash rates of return on assets to simulate the 
risk exposure faced by the typical firm. The primary indicators of 
financial stress employed in these analyses are the debt-service-cover-
age ratio (DSCR) and its three-year moving average (ADSCR). The DSCR 
is defined as the firm's income net of family living expenditures, in-
come taxes, and production expenses other than interest and rental pay-
ments on leased land divided by the firm's annual debt service obliga-
tion including interest on all loans and principal payments on interme-
diate and long-term loans plus land rent. A DSCR of less than 1.0 in 
any year indicates that the firm has insufficient net income after 
taxes and family living expenses to meet its annual debt service obli-
gation. An ADSCR of less than 1.0 indicates that the firm's payments 
problem is more persistent and less likely to be the result of a single 
"bad" year. 
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The results of the analyses for the cash grain farm are summarized 
in Table 9. Note that with only 33 percent of the firm's assets in-
debted, the probability of the ADSCR falling below a value of 1.0 at 
least once in the 10-year model period is 54 percent. This probability 
drops to 28 percent and the firm's average terminal equity increases 
modestly with the interest rate buy-down scheme. The reduced repayment 
rate strategy is less effective in reducing the oddds of a cash flow 
crisis (48 percent probability of ADSCR less than 1.0). If the firm 
elects to restructure its assets through the sale-leaseback of indebted 
land, however, the firm's risk of a payments problem is essentially 
eliminated and a 12.5 percent increase in average terminal equity is 
realized. 
The ability of the 50 percent debt cash grain farm to meet all of 
its financial obligations in a timely manner is at much greater risk 
than that of the 33 percent debt farm, regardless of the financial pol-
icy considered. The ADSCR fell below a value of 1.0 at least once in 
the 10-year model period in all 50 trials of the base, interest-rate 
buy down, and reduced repayment rate scenarios. The interest-rate buy 
down policy was slightly more effective in reducing the firm's finan-
cial stre~s than the reduced repayment rate policy in that fewer over-
all occurrences of an ADSCR less than 1.0 (86 percent) were observed 
with this approach than for the base and reduced repayment rate scenar-
ios (98 percent). For this firm of intermediate leverage, the only 
truly effective option to reduce the probability of a cash flow crisis 
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is the sale-leaseback of indebted land provided in the asset restruc-
turing scenario. Again, this financial strategy effectively eliminates 
the probability of observing an ADSCR less than 1.0 at any time during 
the planning horizon and provides for the highest average terminal 
equity as well. 
The DSCR, and thus the ADSCR, is less than 1.0 in every year of 
all model runs for the 67 percent debt firm under the base, interest-
rate buy down, and reduced repayment rate scenarios. This highly lev-
eraged firm has no choice but the sale-leaseback of indebted land if it 
is to significantly improve its chances of maintaining a positive cash 
flow. Indeed, the firm's initial equity of $308,000 deteriorates to an 
average value of approximately $90,000 under the base and reduced re-
payment rate schemes and to $220,000 under the interest rate buy-down 
scenario. Under the asset restructuring scenario, the firm signifi-
cantly reduces the probability of a cash flow crisis and eliminates the 
risk of insolvency while realizing a positive increment to equity in 
all 50 model runs. 
The results of the hog farm analyses presented in Table 10 paral-
lel those of the cash grain farm analyses discussed above. The major 
distinction between the results of the cash grain farm analyses and the 
hog farm analyses is the generally lower probability of cash flow prob-
lems for the hog farm relative to the cash grain farm, regardless of 
initial debt position or financial scenario considered. 
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The 33 percent debt hog farm is essentially free of difficulty in 
meeting debt service requirements as shown by an ADSCR which never 
falls below 1.0 in 50 runs of each of the four scenarios. For the SO 
percent debt hog farm, the rate buy-down policy reduces the probability 
of observing an ADSCR less than 1.0 from 36 percent in the base sce-
nario to 18 percent. Again, the reduced repayment rate policy is less 
effective than the rate buy-down policy in lowering the probability of 
an ADSCR less than 1.0--the probability is reduced from 36 percent in 
the base to only 28 percent with the repayment adjustment policy. In 
no instance under the asset restructuring policy, however, did the 
ADSCR fall below a value of 1.0, and the average terminal equity under 
this policy is larger than for the other options. 
As was the case for cash grain farms with higher initial levels of 
leverage, the only method among the four analyzed for the 67 percent 
debt hog farm to reduce the probability of a cash flow crisis from rel-
atively high levels (80-92 percent) is the asset restructuring plan. 
Asset restructuring is also the only one of the four scenarios which 
provides for an increase in the firm's initial $322,000 equity in all 
SO model simulations. 
In summary, these micro results indicate that the risk of illiq-
uidity is generally greater for the representative cash grain farm than 
for the hog farm for all initial leverage positions or financial poli-
cies considered. For the more highly leveraged cash grain farm (SO or 
67 percent debt) and the highly leveraged hog farm (67 percent debt), 
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the probability of failure as measured by the ADSCR is very high--ex-
ceeding 90 percent in the base run. The interest rate buy down policy 
is marginally effective in reducing the probability of failure for the 
67 percent leveraged hog farm, but a large reduction in the probability 
of failure of this highly leveraged hog farm and the 67 and 50 percent 
leveraged cash grain farms is attained only with the asset restructur-
ing plan. 
For the representative farms of lower leverage, the 33 percent 
debt cash grain farm and the 50 percent debt hog farm, the probability 
of failure in the base run is much lower than for comparable firms of 
higher leverage. For these firms the interest rate buy-down policy re-
duces the probability of failure by one-half relative to the base run, 
the asset restructuring policy completely eliminates the probability of 
failure, and the reduced repayment rate policy is of intermediate 
effectiveness in reducing the probability of failure. Finally, the 33 
percent debt hog farm is well insulated from the financial stress 
affecting the firms of higher leverage categories; this low leverage 
hog farm is free of the risk of failure as defined by the ADSCR in the 
base scenario and all of the policy scenarios. 
The impact of the policy scenarios on average terminal net worth 
is consistent for both representative farm types across all initial 
debt levels. The reduced repayment rate policy results in essentially 
no change in average terminal net worth relative to the base scenario, 
the interest rate buy-down policy causes a moderate increase in termi-
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nal net worth, and the asset restructuring policy results in the great-
est gain in equity over the 10-year period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Data from Iowa and other states along with that from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture indicate that a significant number of farm-
ers are suffering financial stress. This stress is a result of the 
many changes in the financial environment for agriculture, and is not 
simply a result of lower incomes. Other factors that contribute to the 
financial stress problem of the u.s. agricultural sector are a higher 
debt load, shorter maturities on debt, reduced liquidity, higher and 
more volatile interest rates, increased income and collateral risk, 
limited availability of refinancing alternatives, and asset liquida-
tions. Government policies of the past have contributed to today's fi-
nancial stress by encouraging higher land values, more debt utiliza-
tion, growth in farm size, and higher interest rates. 
Given the complex nature of the financial stress problem, a public 
policy approach that focuses ~nly on one characteristic of that problem 
will probably be ineffective. Specifically, price and income support 
programs which have been the major component of agricultural policy in 
the past may be quite ineffective in solving the current financial 
stress problem--such programs do not focus on some of the major dimen-
sions of the stress problem (i.e. loan maturities, liquidity, collat-
eral risk, etc.), and furthermore quite likely will not be targeted to 
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those individuals who have financial stress. Such programs may in fact 
compound and contribute to the longer run financial problems in agri-
culture. 
Various policy options that are more targeted to the financial 
stress problem have been identified including interest rate buy-downs, 
debt moratoriums, debt restructuring, bankruptcy, asset restructuring, 
recapitalization, etc. While spiraling farm debt suggests that debt 
restructuring is the answer to the current financial stress, a restruc-
turing of agricultural assets remains the key to a long-term solution. 
The results of both the firm level and the aggregate analyses indicate 
that asset restructuring through sale-leasebacks is a preferred option 
to interest rate buy-downs or liability restructuring in reducing fi-
nancial stress for individual farm firms and the industry. The re-
arranging of liabilities is not a permanent solution to the current 
financial stress, because even with more time to repay, many farmers 
will not be able to service their debt with current or expected inter-
est rates, productivity, and input and commodity prices. However, debt 
restructuring is an important mechanism for buying time to implement 
more permanent solutions. Asset restructuring, including liquidation, 
debt reductions, and equity infusions will be required to improve the 
chances of long-term survivability of many farm businesses. The aggre-
gate analyses indicate that a general reduction in interest rates and 
more rapid growth in exports would significantly reduce the financial 
stress that the agricultural sector is facing. 
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One of the key objectives of any public policy to alleviate finan-
cial stress should be to protect the resource markets from collapsing--
stabilizing resource values is critical to maintaining the stability of 
the agricultural production sector and rural communities. If resource 
values decline precipitously because of excessive supplies being 
offered to a market that has no liquidity to absorb them, many farmers 
who were a "good credit risk" will no longer be so because of declining 
collateral values. But using government intervention to stabilize re-
source values at levels that are not supportable in the long-run by 
market prices can result in very high government costs, inefficient re-
source allocation, and higher consumer prices for food products. Such 
a result is also clearly not desirable. 
The agricultural sector has suffered significant wealth losses 
during the recent years. An important public policy concern is how 
those losses will be shared among the various firms in the private sec-
tor (farmers, lenders, input supply firms, landlords, etc.) and between 
the public sector and the private sector. A related concern is how to 
keep the losses from becoming'more severe than they need be. What may 
be needed is a public sector contingency plan that can provide a safety 
net in ca~e the farm economy continues to be stagnant and/or the re-
source markets began to collapse. A strategy of doing nothing today 
could, if the financial condition of agriculture continues to deterio-
rate, very easily result in irresistable political and economic pres-
sures to implement drastic options later such as a general and extended 
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debt moratorium or significant increases in commodity support prices. 
But inappropriate action now may interfere with the longer-run adjust-
ments in resource values and utilization that must occur to retain an 
efficient and financially sound agricultural sector. 
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Table 1. u.s. Farms: Debts and Assets by Leverage 
Debt til Asset Ratio (percent) 
0-10 11-liO 41-70 71+ Total (%) 
Operators (%) 58 ,14 11 8 100 
Debt (%) 5 32 32 31 100 
Assets (%) 47 32 14 8 100 
Source: Melichar Jan. 84 Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Table 2. Estimated Percentage Distributions of Sample Farm Operators, 
* Their Assets and Liabilities by Relative Debt Levels 
Debt to Asset Ratios 
0-10 11-40 41-70 71+ 
Percent operators 36 35 l'il TO 
Percent Assets 30 40 21 9 
Percent Liabilities 3 32 40 25 
Source: Farm Finance Survey, March 1984, Iowa Departmet of 
Agriculture. 
*Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding errors. 
so 
Table 3. Estimated Percentage Distributions of Iowa Farm O~erators, Their Debt 
and Assets by Farm Size and Debt Level Categories 















































































































Source: Farm Finance Survey, March 1984, Iowa Department of Agriculture. 
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Table 4, Farm Financial Indicators - Base Run 
Real lt>n real Interest Interest Net farm Net cash 
estate estate re- rete on rate on lna>me flow Equity/ Debt/ 
repay- payment real es- non-rec~fl (1977 !nominal Llabll- Asset asset 
Years ment rate rate tate debt estate debt <bllars 1 <bllarsl Assets I ties Equity Ratio ratio 
-------percent------- -----------------------..11 I Ions-------------------------
1981 10.2 18.4 0,081 0,137 33,326,3 808,008,4 159,378.5 648,629,8 0,803 o. 197 
1982 10.4 18.7 0.081 o. 130 35,011.7 37,781.1 825,560.7 163,480,6 662,080,0 0.802 o. 198 
1983 10,6 19, I 0,082 o. 128 38,667.6 41,742.3 816,613,4 167,161.8 649,451.6 o. 795 0,205 
1984 10,8 19,5 0,083 o. 128 38, 145,6 46,672.6 1, 062, 083, 0 177,315,8 884,767.2 0,833 o. 167 
V> ,_. 
1985 11,0 19,9 0.084 o. 129 37,162,8 46,679.0 1,136,924,6 188,930, I 947,994,5 0,834 o. 166 
1986 11,3 20,3 0,085 o. 131 37,075,3 47,319.0 1,184,135,2 201,521,9 982,613.3 0,830 o. 170 
1987 11.5 20.7 0,086 o. 134 36,060,3 46,590.6 1, 235,006. 2 214,682.9 1,020,323.3 0,826 o. 174 
1988 11.7 21. 1 0.087 o. 136 34,324,6 44,505,8 1, 276,684.6 227,951,4 1,048, 733,2 o. 821 o. 179 
1989 12.0 21.5 0,089 o. 139 33,209.8 42,953,4 1,303,153,4 241,221.7 1,061,931.6 0,815 o. 185 
1990 12.2 21.9 0,090 o. 142 33,405,4 43, 184,0 1,327,689,0 254,463,0 1, 073,226, I 0,808 0, 192 
1995 13,5 24.2 0,097 o. 156 24,734,3 28,089.6 1,444,217.2 320,314.5 1,123,902.6 o. 778 0,222 
Tobie 5. farm flnonclal Indicators - Interest Rete Buy-lhwn (Including forced repayment of nonreal estate debt) 
Real lt>n real Interest ·Interest Net far., Net CZISh 
estate estate re- rate on rate on lnooma flow Equity/ Debt/ 
repay- payment real es- non-real (1977 (nominal Llabll- Ass~tt ~SS@t 
Years ment rate rate tote debt estate debt cbllars) cbllars) Assets I ties Equity Retlo ratio 
--------percent------- -------------------------mill Ions------------------------
1961 10.2 18,4 0,081 o. 137 33,326,3 608,008,4 159,378,6 648,629,8 0,803 o, 197 
1982 10,4 18,7 0.081 o. no 35,011.7 37,781. I 825,560,7 163,480,6 662,080, I 0,602 o. 198 
1963 10,6 19, 1 0,082 o. 128 36,667,6 41,742.3 816,613,4 167,161,8 649,451,6 0, 795 o. 205 
1964 10,8 19.5 0,083 o. 128 36, 145,6 46,672,6 1,062,083,0 177,315,8 884,767,2 0.633 0, 167 
"' N 
1965 11.0 19,9 0,054 0,089 37,112,8 47,113.4 1,136,924,6 184,764,5 952, 160, 1 o.8.H o. 163 
1966 11,3 20,3 0,055 0,091 41,902,7 50,398.9 I, 185, 974; 6 194,096,0 991,878,6 0,836 o. 164 
1967 II, 5 20.7 0,056 0,094 41,325,1 51,045,9 1,236,299,4 204,630,2 1,026,669,3 0,834 o. 166 
1968 II, 7 21, 1 0,057 0,096 39,914.4 50, 153, 1 1,277,479.8 215,721.4 1,052, 758,4 0.830 o. 170 
1969 12,0 21. 5 0,089 0,139 34, 539.4 49,190,4 1, 310, 464, 7 231,583.9 1, 078, 860. 9 0,823 0,177 
1990 12.2 21,9 0,090 o. 142 33,850,6 47,419,6 1,379,226,3 248,683,6 1, 130,542.7 0,820 0, lBO 
1995 13.5 24.2 0,097 0,156 24,778,8 28, 599,7 1,445,085,4 319,875.7 1,125,209,8 o. 779 o. 221 
Table 6. Farm Financial Indicators -Lengthening Repayment Terms !Reduce Repayment Rate> 
Real tbn real Interest Interest Net farm Net cash 
estate estate re- rote on rate on lnoome flow Equl ty I Debt/ 
repay- payment reel es- non-real !1977 (nominal Llabll- Asset asset 
Years ment rate rate tate debt estate debt <hi Iars) <hllors) Assets I ties Equl ty Retlo ratio 
--------percent------- ------------------------mill Ions-------------------------
1981 10.2 18.4 0,081 o. 137 33,326.3 808,008.4 159,378,6 648,629,8 0,803 o. 197 
1982 10,4 18.7 0,081 o. 130 35,011.7 37,781,1 825,560.7 163,480.6 662,080. 1 0.802 o. 198 
1983 10.6 19. 1 0,082 o. 128 38,667,6 41,742,3 816,613.4 167,161.8 649,451,6 o. 795 o. 205 
1984 10,8 19.5 0,083 o. 128 38, 145.6 46,672,6 1, 062, 083.0 177,315,8 884,767,2 o. 833 o. 167 
en 
w 
1985 8. 3 14.9 0,084 o. 129 37,079.6 53, 151.7 1,137,644.9 195,741.0 941,902,8 0,828 o. 172 
1986 8,4 15.2 0.085 0,131 36,368.1 52,668,7 1,185,443.6 214,752. 1 970,690,5 o. 819 o. 181 
1987 8,6 15. 5 0,086 0,134 34,832.7 50,888.6 1, 232,466.4 233,913.6 998,552.8 0.810 o. 190 
1988 8,9 15,8 0.087 o. 136 32,677.5 47,788,4 1, 266,024.3 252,687.6 1, 013,336.7 0,800 o. 200 
1989 12,0 21.5 0.089 0,139 31,204.7 35,779,8 1, 284,712.4 261,481.1 1,023,231,2 o. 796 o. 204 
1990 12.2 21.9 0,090 o. 142 31,830.7 37,068,3 1,301, 736,0 270,675.3 1,031,060,8 0,792 o. 208 
1995 13.5 24.2 0,097 o. 156 23,976.0 26,020,0 1,433,360.4 325, 170.4 1,108,190,0 o. 773 o. 227 
Table 7. Farm Financial Indicators - (Stronger Economy) 
Real Ibn rea I Interest Interest Net farm Net a!Sh 
estate estate re- rate on rate on Income flow Equity/ Debt/ 
repay- payment real es- noo....-eal (1977 (nominal Llabll- Asset asset 
Years ment rate rate tate debt estate debt cbllarsl cbllarsl Assets I ties Equity Ratio ratio 
--------percent------- -------------------------mill Ions------------------------
1961 10.2 18.4 0.081 o. 137 36,479.5 808,655. 1 159,396. 7 649,258.4 o. 803 o. 197 
1962 10.4 18.7 0.081 o. 130 39,003.5 42,874.6 826,326.2 163,574.2 662,752.0 o. 802 o. 198 
1963 10.6 19. I 0.082 o. 128 42,886.8 47,231.7 817,611.2 167,415.9 650, 195.4 o. 795 0.205 
1984 10.8 19.5 0.083 o. 128 42,173. I 53,586.9 1,130,927. 7 179,620.4 951,307.3 o. 841 o. 159 IJ> 
('· 
1985 11.0 19.9 0.054 0.099 40,683. 7 53,410. 5 1,215,099.8 193,869.9 1,021,230.0 0.840 o. 160 
1986 11.3 20.3 0.055 o. 101 44,288.9 58,767.9 1, 268,703.6 208,745.3 1, 059,958.3 o. 835 o. 165 
1987 11. 5 20.7 0.056 o. 104 42,731.4 58,316.2 1, 352,541.5 225,066.0 1,127,475.5 0.836 0.164 
1988 
"· 7 21.9 0.057 o. 106 40,736.0 56,855.6 1,428,146.8 242,293.6 I, 185,853. I 0.830 o. 170 
1989 12.0 21.5 0.059 o. 109 39,275.9 54,769.5 1,458,310.1 259,054.7 I, 199,255.4 0.822 o. 178 
1990 12.2 21.9 0.060 o. 112 38,881.8 54, 122.6 1, 486,500.9 275,402.6 1,211,098.3 0.815 o. 185 
1995 13.5 24.2 0.067 o. 126 30,655. 1 40,761.8 1,615,732.7 353, 542.0 1, 262, 190.7 o. 781 o. 219 
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Asset Value Increase 
Current Intermediate Fixed 
Assets Assets Assets 
- - - - -(Percent) - - - - -
0 0 1. 9 
0 0 1.9 
0 0 1. 9 
0 0 1. 9 
Loan Terms 
Current Intermediate Long-Term 
1 yr. @ 14% 1 yr. @ 14% 25 yr. @ 12% 
Interest rate on current and intermed-
iate debt reduced to 10% in initial 
year of planning horizon, 14% there-
after; rate on long-term debt 9% for 
first 4 years, 12% thereafter 
I I 
Principal payments on long-term (real 
estate) debt reduced by 25% for first 
4 years; payments in later years cor-
respondingly higher 
1 yr. @ 14% 1 yr. @ 14% Leased 
t 
Table 9. Results of representatlvll_ msh grain farm analyses 
lbdel 
1\-oboblllty of !lebt 
ServIce Coverage Rat lo 
Less Than 1.0 
In Any Annual In Any 
1\-oboblllty of 3-yr, Ave, 
!lebt Servl ce Coverage 
Ratio Less Than 1,0 
Terminal Equity 
Observation I lbdel Perlod2 --------------~~~ 
In Any Annual 
Obser ""t ton 3 
In Any 
lbdel Perlod4 Average Range 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -(percent)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(do II ars l- - - - - -
33 Percent Debt 
Base 29 82 17 54 799,882 694,205- 870,590 
Interest Rate Buy-Dbwn 20 74 8 28 829,710 737,406 - 899,907 
Reduced Repayment Rate 25 80 15 48 799,884 695,353 - 870,089 
Asset Restructuring 1 14 0 0 899,926 795,843 - 1,003,493 
50 Percent Debt 
Base 92 100 98 100 492,140 303,645 - 601,114 
Interest Rate Buy-Dbwn 73 100 86 100 555,656 399,273 - 644,419 
Reduced Repayment Rate 89 100 98 100 494,277 306,523- 602,366 
Asset Restructuring 8 26 0 0 668,697 565,691 - 770,827 
67 Percent Debt 
Base 100 100 100 100 86,230 ( 174, 998)- 245,512 
Interest Rate Buy-Dbwn 100 100 100 100 221,428 22,062 - 347,560 
Reduced Repayment Rate 100 100 100 100 90,083 ( 171, 144)- 249,365 
Asset Restructuring 37 68 10 34 423, 182 320,195 - 515,061 
1The proportion of 500 observations ( 10 years x 50 runs) of the DSCR with a value of less than 1.0. 
2The proportion of 50 model runs In which the value of the DSCR fell below 1.0 at least once In the to-year no del per lod, 
3rhe pro port I on of 400 observations (8years x 50runsl of the ADSCR with a wl ue of less than 1.0. 
4rhe proportion of 50 model runs In wh 1 ch the "'I ue of the ADSCR fell below 1,0 at least once In the to-year node! period. 
"' a-
T~ble 10. Results of represent~tlve hog farm analyses 
It> del 
33 Percent Debt 
Base 
Interest Rate Buy-Down 
Reduced Repayment Rate 
Asset Restructuring 
50 Percent Debt 
Base 
Interest Rate Buy-Down 
Reduced Repayment Rate 
Asset Restructuring 
67 Percent Debt 
Base 
Interest Rate Buy-Down 
Reduced Repayment Rate 
Asset Restructuring 
1The proportion of 
2The proportion of 
3rhe proportion of 
4rhe proportion of 
Probability of Debt 
Service Coven~ge Ratlo 
Less Than I. 0 
Probability of 3-yr. Ave. 
Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio Less Than 1.0 
In Any Annual 
ObservatIon 1 
In Any 
M:>del Perlod 2 
In Any Annual 
Observat lon 3 
In Any Terminal Equity 
It> del Per lod4 Average Range 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -(percent)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --- -<oollarsl- -
6 20 0 0 1,111,006 867,765 - 1,370,145 
4 14 0 0 1' 146,494 907,841 - 1,405,283 
5 22 0 0 I, 112,778 868,737 - 1,373,140 
I 0 0 I, 360,227 975,307 - I, 788, 137 
20 68 10 36 777,407 524,976 - I, 000,256 
15 56 5 18 837,039 595,862 - 1,069,931 
19 66 8 28 779,718 526,846 - 1,004,210 
3 20 0 0 1,119,841 756,990 - 1,607,309 
49 96 55 92 440,866 127,390 - 653,342 
39 88 36 80 524,589 252,516- 732,026 
48 94 52 90 443, 196 130,835 - 656,769 
6 12 0 0 849,383 485,.483 - 1,430, 565 
500 observations ( 10 years x 50 runs) of the DSCR with a value of less than 1.0. 
50 model runs In which the va I ue of the DSCR tel I below 1.0 at least once In the 10-year nodel per lad. 
400 observations ( 8 years x 50 runs l of the ADSCR with a value of less th~n 1.0. 
50 model runs In which the value of the ADSCR fell below 1.0 at least once In the 10-year nodel per lad. 
\.n 
.._, 
